ST. LOUIS – The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the ruling of a lower federal court that St. Louis County Animal Care & Control officials did not violate the constitutional rights of a pet owner whose dog they euthanized, finding the officials had reasonable reliance on consent provided by the plaintiff’s spouse.
Eighth Circuit judges James B. Loken, Steven M. Colloton and Jane Kelly upheld the ruling of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, in litigation brought by Erin Bulfin versus Becky Rainwater, Renita Hawkins, Maryanne Willis, Vanessa Duris and Philip Wagenknecht (in their individual capacities), in addition to St. Louis County.
Loken wrote the Court’s opinion in this matter.
“Bulfin and Nea were married when she purchased Daisy in March 2014, with Nea present, and paid for the dog from a joint bank account. Daisy lived with Bulfin, Nea, and their children as a pet. On Dec. 26, 2019, Daisy bit their daughter in the face, requiring hospitalization, stitches and treatment. The next morning, after the daughter’s release from the hospital, Bulfin called her veterinarian’s office, reported the bite incident and was told to contact ACC. Bulfin called ACC, reported that Daisy had bitten her daughter, and discussed her options with defendant Rebecca Rainwater. While the details of the conversation are disputed – whether it was limited to the need to quarantine Daisy for 10 days under a local ordinance, or included Bulfin inquiring about having Daisy euthanized at ACC – it is undisputed that at the end of the conversation Bulfin told Rainwater that her husband would bring Daisy to ACC that day,” Loken said.
“Nea brought Daisy to ACC that afternoon. He told defendant Renita Hawkins, who was working the animal intake desk, that Daisy had bitten his daughter the night before and that his wife had called ACC earlier. The conversations during Nea’s visit are disputed. Hawkins testified, with some corroboration from others, that Nea insisted Daisy be euthanized that day because he did not want Daisy held in the shelter over the weekend. Hawkins also testified that Rainwater, her supervisor, came out and explained to Nea that animals that have bitten people are typically quarantined for 10 days before being euthanized, but Nea insisted on immediate euthanasia. Nea testified he only spoke to Hawkins and told her that he wanted Daisy quarantined for 10 days. It is undisputed that ‘defendant Hawkins…explained the process and paperwork to Edward Nea.”
Hawkins prepared two forms, an “Intake Form” and a “Bite Form.” The Intake Form is a single-page, double-sided form used for the intake of an animal at ACC for any reason, which has numerous boxes to indicate whether the animal is owned or a stray and why it is being received.
One box was labeled “(ORE) OWNER REQUESTS EUTHANASIA (Not Mandatory for Surrender).” There are spaces where the person conducting the intake can write in information including the name and address of the person surrendering the animal, the time the animal is received and the reason for its surrender to ACC. Recording information Nea provided, Hawkins checked the preprinted ORE box, boxes stating that Daisy was an owned animal brought in as a “bite case”, Nea’s name and address and Bulfin’s phone number. Hawkins wrote Jan. 6, 2020 on the line labeled “Quarantine End/ Date Sent to Lab,” and noted that Daisy was assigned to kennel number 706, located in ACC’s “bite quarantine room.”
The Intake Form includes three separate boxes describing three types of authorization by the person surrendering the animal: “Authorization for Transfer of Custody of Animal”, “Authorization for Relinquishment of Rights to Owned Animal” and “Authorization for Relinquishment of Rights to Owned Animal for Purpose of Euthanasia” – all of which Nea signed authorization for, on the signature line underneath each box.
“Nea claims he did not read the Intake Form and its authorizations, believed he was signing the form to place Daisy in a 10-day quarantine, and signed where Hawkins directed him to sign. There is no dispute that Nea was not rushed as he reviewed the form and could have read the authorizations had he so chosen. On the Bite Form, based on information provided by Nea, Hawkins wrote Nea’s contact information and the daughter’s name under the ‘Victim Name’ entry, listed ‘Edward/Erin Nea’ as the victim’s parents and gave a short description of the bite incident, including the date. Under the ‘Date Quarantine Ends’ box, Hawkins wrote Jan. 6, 2020. After signing the authorizations on the Intake Form, Nea took Daisy outside. ACC employee Clinton Wall approached and took Daisy back into the building. Wall testified that Nea was crying and talking to the dog, like many dog owners Wall has seen saying goodbye to their animals. Nea then left ACC,” Loken said.
“Meanwhile, Hawkins passed Daisy’s completed Intake Form to Rainwater, saying Hawkins believed Daisy should be quarantined for 10 days because she had bitten someone. Rainwater told her that if an owner requests immediate euthanasia (ORE), ACC can honor the request. Rainwater learned that defendant Dr. Philip Wagenknecht, an ACC contract veterinarian, was still at ACC conversing with defendant Dr. Vanessa Duris, the Director of ACC. Rainwater asked Dr. Wagenknecht if he had time to perform one more euthanasia. Dr. Wagenknecht said yes, with assistance. Dr. Duris testified she does not recall being asked or granting permission for the euthanasia to proceed. Defendant Maryanne Willis agreed to assist Dr. Wagenknecht. She retrieved Daisy from the kennel and discovered by using a scanner that Daisy had an identifying microchip implant. Willis called the microchip company, which confirmed that Daisy’s registered owner was ‘Erin Nea’ at the address on Edward Nea’s driver’s license that Hawkins put on the Intake Form. Willis gave this information to Rainwater, who authorized the euthanasia to proceed. Dr. Wagenknecht euthanized Daisy. It is undisputed that Dr. Wagenknecht does not review an animal’s intake paperwork prior to euthanizing; he simply performs euthanasias that ACC employees request.”
When Bulfin went to ACC the next morning to pick Daisy up for home quarantine. Rainwater told her that Daisy had been euthanized the day before, which led to the lawsuit in question. Bulfin’s complaint alleged numerous violations of state and federal law in 30 counts.
Only her federal Section1983 claims are at issue on appeal, including “municipal liability claims against the County alleging failure to train or supervise its employees and an unlawful pattern, practice or custom of euthanizing animals in its custody.”
“When ACC accepted custody of Daisy from Nea, he signed a document expressly authorizing Daisy’s euthanization…Following discovery, responding to cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court concluded that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. The Court held that no reasonable jury could find that Nea lacked actual or at least apparent authority over Daisy when he signed the Intake Form authorizing euthanasia and turned Daisy over to ACC. However, the court noted, an initially lawful seizure can violate the Fourth Amendment if ‘its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests,” Loken stated.
“Here, Bulfin did not personally request that Daisy be euthanized, and Bulfin’s possessory interest in Daisy ‘may not have been extinguished by Nea’s actions,’ creating a fact issue that ‘would typically preclude summary judgment.’ However, Section 1983 liability is individual. After reviewing the record evidence of each individual defendant’s conduct, the Court concluded that Bulfin failed to present evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that the conduct of any individual defendant violated Bulfin’s Fourth Amendment rights by interfering with her possessory interest in Daisy in an objectively unreasonable manner.”
Alternatively, the Court concluded that the individual defendants are “entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clearly established authority holding ‘that government officials…violate the Fourth Amendment by seizing and destroying an effect with the consent of a person who reasonably has actual or apparent authority.”
The District Court further concluded Bulfin’s municipal liability claims failed on the merits and because there was no underlying Fourth Amendment violation by any County actor, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the federal law claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bulfin’s state law claims.
Bulfin then appealed the grant of summary judgment to all defendants on her federal claims, to the Eighth Circuit.
“On appeal, Bulfin first argues that the above-summarized third-party consent doctrine is an exception to the search clause of the Fourth Amendment and the District Court erred in applying this exception to Daisy’s seizure. Bulfin cites no federal authority supporting this contention. We conclude it is without merit. Here, though Nea chose not to join in Bulfin’s lawsuit for tactical or other reasons, he was a co-owner with common authority over Daisy, their household pet,” Loken said.
“Bulfin next argues that, even if Nea’s consent was ‘binding’ on her, disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants on her Fourth Amendment seizure claims. The first disputed issue, she argues, is whether the Intake Form authorized Daisy’s immediate destruction, or whether it ‘should be read as authorizing Daisy’s temporary relinquishment to ACC for a 10-day quarantine’ with a ‘notice’ of ACC’s right to euthanize if neither Bulfin or Nea reclaimed Daisy, consistent with Nea’s testimony of his understanding when he left ACC. This contention is without merit.”
Loken clarified that “the relevant question is whether each individual defendant was objectively reasonable in believing that Nea consented to Daisy’s euthanasia” and that “it was undisputed that this Intake Form was used for all animals brought in for ACC custody for any reason.”
Loken added that in reference to Daisy, “Hawkins and everyone who had any contact with Bulfin or Nea learned that the dog bit their daughter the prior day, so the conflicting statement on a pre-printed form is not material to the Fourth Amendment seizure issue.”
According to Loken and his colleagues, the Eighth Circuit “agreed with the District Court that no reasonable jury could find the individual defendants unreasonably relied on the clear language of the Authorization in determining Nea knowingly and voluntarily consented to Daisy’s euthanasia” – and that “state actors need not take affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting co-owner before acting on the permission they have received.”
“Bulfin further argues she presented sufficient evidence of each defendant’s direct or integral participation in the Fourth Amendment violations ‘as well as defendant Duris’ direct and supervisory liability and her integral participation.’ Like the District Court, we disagree,” Loken stated.
“Hawkins testified that Nea insisted on euthanizing Daisy immediately; Nea testified he only requested a 10-day quarantine. This fact issue is immaterial to Hawkins’s individual Section 1983 liability. There is no evidence she was involved in the decision to euthanize Daisy, had authority to authorize or prevent euthanasia or was involved in preparing Daisy for euthanasia. Hawkins may or may not have made mistakes in filling out the Intake Form, but once the paperwork was complete, her involvement ended. As the District Court properly noted, negligence in filling out paperwork ‘does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. It was objectively reasonable for defendant Rainwater to believe that Nea authorized ACC to euthanize Daisy when he signed the ORE Authorization, and that the Animal Control Code therefore authorized her to approve immediate euthanasia. She then sought out Dr. Wagenknecht to perform it that day and recruited Willis to confirm Daisy’s ownership information and assist in the euthanasia.”
Bulfin also argued the District Court “erred in ruling that the individual defendants are protected by qualified immunity because the alleged Fourth Amendment violation was not a clearly established right” – but the Eighth Circuit disagreed and likewise dismissed this claim, in addition to the claims against St. Louis County.
“Bulfin has not cited and we have not found any authority that demonstrates the defendants violated any clearly established law. But in any event, we need not decide this issue,” Loken said.
“Because we conclude that none of the St. Louis County employees or agents violated Bulfin’s constitutional rights, the alleged failure to train or supervise and unconstitutional practice claims against the County require little discussion. Bulfin has not argued that any exception to that rule applies in this case. Because no County employee or agent violated Bulfin’s rights when Daisy was euthanized, her municipal liability claims against the County fail as well. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.”
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit case 23-2357
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri case 4:20-cv-00869
From the St. Louis Record: Reach Courts Reporter Nicholas Malfitano at nick.malfitano@therecordinc.com